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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The arrival of over 1 million people in Europe in 2015 and the sense of crisis it provoked have renewed 
debates on appropriate ways to establish a more orderly migration management system. How can we 
ensure pathways are available for those in genuine need of protection, while reducing the number of 
migrants arriving irregularly? “Legal pathways” are often presented as an essential tool toward this 
end. In 2015, Germany created such legal pathways in the form of access to the German labor market 
in a little known, and almost accidental migration policy experiment: the Western Balkan Regulation. 
Against the backdrop of large numbers of people arriving in Germany from the six Western Balkan 
states (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia) who had almost 
no chance of receiving asylum and then from 2015 the sudden increase of Syrians and others coming 
through the Balkan route, the regulation was part of a broader initiative in Berlin to reduce the numbers 
of people seeking asylum. The regulation, also known as section 26.2 (§26.2) of the employment 
regulation (Beschäftigungsverordnung), essentially opened the labor market for nationals from the six 
Western Balkan countries, without, more surprisingly, including any minimum skill or qualification 
requirements. The only pre-requisite was a valid job offer by an employer in Germany, subject to a 
standard priority check for third country nationals.
The Western Balkan Regulation is now being invoked by some German politicians as a success and 
a model to apply to other countries and regions, such as North Africa, when it comes to migration 
management and irregular migration. These references often imply that creating legal pathways is an 
effective component of reducing irregular migration, in that it somehow “re-routes” part of it to legal 
channels – channels that are simultaneously in line with labor market needs. There are others who offer 
a more critical perspective and do not support the continuation of the regulation after 2020 or beyond 
the Western Balkans. Although the number of asylum applications from the Western Balkans did drop 
after the regulation, it is not clear how big of a role the new process played – nor is it certain what labor 
market consequences the regulation may have in the medium or longer term. 
While the policy environment at the time was so complex that one cannot credibly single out the exact 
effect the Western Balkan Regulation had on reducing irregular migration from the region to Germany 
specifically, it is nonetheless a unique migration policy experiment from which important lessons can be 
drawn, lessons that are even more relevant as policy makers are considering using the regulation as a 
model for other regions or countries going forward. 
FINDINGS AND LESSONS FROM THE WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION
• Since the regulation entered into force, over 117,123 valid work contracts for applicants from the 
Western Balkans were submitted and approved under §26.2 in 2016-17 by the Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit); of these 44,093 received visas for work during the same time period. 
This coincided with a significant drop of asylum seekers from the region of over 90%, from the height 
of 120,882 first time asylum applications in 2015, to 34,360 in 2016, to 10,915 in 2017.
• However, as the regulation was only one of many policy measures at the time, including many 
restrictive measures and faster processing times of asylum applications as well as the “closure” of the 
Western Balkan route, it is not possible to isolate the exact causal role the Western Balkan Regulation 
may have played. It is plausible that it contributed.
• Of the work contracts submitted for pre-approval under the regulation, for 2016-17, 51% were in the 
“Helper” (Helfer) category (unskilled or low skilled) 46% skilled (Fachkräfte). In 2017, the plurality, or 
42%, of pre-approvals were in the construction sector; hospitality and the health care sector were the 
other biggest fields. 
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• The regulation was born out of a grand political bargain between different political parties. It was 
pushed by Germany’s more liberal parties, as part of negotiations on two asylum packages containing 
largely restrictive measures towards asylum seekers, and discussions on designating Albania, Kosovo 
and Montenegro “safe countries of origin.” This resulted in an unclear migration policy logic regarding 
how exactly the regulation would potentially influence migration to Germany from the region and 
which people exactly the regulation was intended for.
• The implementation suffered from process issues related to the initial set up, and underdefined 
responsibilities between different agencies, for instance between embassies, the employment agency, 
the foreigner’s office or German customs. This, in turn, has given rise to concerns about alleged 
misuse of the regulation. 
• There were no monitoring or information collection mechanisms built into the process that could 
have provided valuable data for evaluation. Improving this would be important to address worries of 
misuse and to provide more insights for future policies.
• There was not a clear communication strategy toward or in the Western Balkan countries, and some 
policymakers in these countries did not even know the regulation existed. The lack of official or 
proactive communication also left space for dubious information from local recruiters and informal 
networks.
• There were significant differences between the six Western Balkan countries. This indicates that 
many different variables are at play. One crucial variable is diaspora networks, which play a role in 
communication and contract facilitation, and thus should be considered in the crafting of policy.
Our conclusion is that there are key factors that should be addressed and analyzed in greater detail for 
any future policy that seeks to draw on or use the Western Balkan Regulation as model. These include: 
1. Apply a clearer policy logic on how exactly “legal pathways” will address a given migration policy 
goal. Is it a foreign policy logic needed to ease return and deportation policies with countries of 
origin? Is it to “re-route” irregular migration from a country or region to regular channels? Is it based 
on real demands of the labor market? A demographic argument?
2. There is no “one size fits all approach” when transferring this model. Rather, depending on the 
country, different factors regarding the labor market, diaspora ties etc. will influence how any 
regulation plays out in practice.
3. Improve coordination processes and adapt mandates of various government agencies in order to 
maintain the credibility of legal immigration channels. This includes establishing better cooperation 
mechanisms between German embassies, the employment agency, the foreigners office, and 
customs, among others.
4. Consider labor market and development implications both in Germany and the country of origin, 
for example regarding brain drain in certain sectors, or implications for the low skilled labor market 
in Germany.
5. Develop a systematic communication strategy, in order to limit misinformation or rumors 
spread by, say, dubious recruitment agencies, and to better manage expectations of individuals and 
governments in partner countries. 
At a time when Germany is reordering both its asylum and immigration laws and systems, the lessons 
from the Western Balkan Regulation can offer valuable insights, also as Germany and Europe are 
shifting their focus toward partnerships with African countries on the management of migration. This 
is particularly important as the general assumption remains in place that legal pathways are at least a 
partial but crucial component in managing irregular migration.1 
1 	 The	information	and	analysis	presented	in	this	policy	paper	is	based	on	publicly	available	data	as	well	as	field	research	and	
28	background	interviews	with	government	representatives,	ministry	officials,	private	sector	associations,	researchers,	and	
civil society actors in Germany, Kosovo, and Serbia, conducted by the authors between January and July 2018. Interviews 
were	conducted	in	German	or	English.	While	the	interviews	and	research	looked	into	the	regulation	in	general,	further	field	
research	in	the	four	other	Western	Balkan	countries	may	reveal	more	country-specific	findings.
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The arrival of over 1 million people in Europe in 2015 provoked a sense of crisis and a search for 
responses. Since then, reinvigorated debates have continued as Europe, and Germany in particular, 
are trying to find appropriate ways to create a more orderly migration management system: ensuring 
pathways are available for those in genuine need of protection, while reducing the number of migrants 
arriving irregularly.2 “Legal pathways” are often presented in these policy debates as an essential part 
of the answer. If you can offer people a way to arrive legally, fewer will arrive irregularly; so goes the 
common-sense assumption of a holistic migration approach. 
Calls for legal or regular pathways can refer to many different things: from creating safe pathways for 
refugees, to expanding visa options and basic travel or for student exchanges, creating new training 
programs, to opening more legal channels for employment, to name a few. Each suggestion has its own 
policy logic on how exactly such regular channels would contribute to decreasing irregular migration. 
Enhancing access to visas or bilateral projects on training and study programs can be a powerful tool 
in negotiations with third countries to achieve different migration policy aims, including securing 
cooperation on returns and readmission. If returns to third countries are more common, the incentive 
may be lowered for people to leave their country in the first place. Offering safe passages for refugees 
of persecution and war aims to reduce the number of people that would otherwise embark on risky 
journeys along irregular migration routes. The logic of opening-up more labor migration channels as 
a method to address irregular migration, in turn, implies a “re-routing effect,” by which those who 
would otherwise arrive and enter the asylum system or stay in a country without any legal status will 
be incentivized to try to receive a legal work permit from home, rather than embark across borders 
irregularly. 
This re-routing assumption is a more controversial aspect of the legal-pathways argument. First, 
there is simply no conclusive evidence on whether offering more legal labor migration opportunities 
would indeed reduce irregular migration, and if so, under which conditions or exactly how.3 Second, it 
raises the question on whether migrant receiving countries—specifically those with generous welfare 
systems—are advised to further open-up labor migration channels, including to low-skilled migrants, as 
one component to manage irregular migration from specific countries or regions. 
2 	 Irregular	migration	can	refer	to	cases	where	people	either	enter	and	stay	in	the	country	without	a	status	or	apply	for	
asylum system in the hope of getting some form of temporary residence permit, even though the asylum system is not 
the appropriate channel for them, if say, they are primarily looking for better living conditions or economic opportunities. 
Refugees with a genuine need of protection often also enter countries irregularly, as this is sometimes the only means to 
file	for	asylum.	As	both	groups	often	travel	via	the	same	routes,	and	end	up	in	the	same	administrative	processes,	these	
“mixed	migration	flows”	complicate	efforts	to	differentiate	different	types	of	people,	and	all	may	be	“irregular”	at	one	point	
or another. This paper uses the term irregular migration to address those type of irregular migrants who generally do not 
qualify for some form of protection. 
3 	 Clemens,	M	&	Gough,	K,	(2018).	Can Regular Migration Channels Reduce Irregular Migration? Lessons for Europe from the United 
States. In Center for Global Development, CDG Brief. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2JbInrO 
 As Clemens et. al point out, there is some indication from the US Mexican border experience that mere regular migration 
channels can be a necessary corollary to stricter enforcement measures, while conversely, legal channels themselves can 
only assist in reducing irregular migration when enforcement is stepped up as well. Overall, much more research is needed 
to	find	evidence	not	on	whether	legal	pathways	for	regular	migration	influence	migration	patterns	but	exactly how and 
under which conditions they can decrease irregular migration.
1. INTRODUCTION
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In	2015,	at	the	height	of	the	refugee	crisis,	Germany	passed	a	little	known	legislative	measure	that	fits	
squarely into the questions surrounding this legal pathway approach: The Western Balkan Regulation 
(Westbalkanregelung).	Passed	in	the	midst	of	fierce	parliamentary	debates	of	the	summer	and	fall	of	2015	
and couched among a package of restrictive asylum legislation (Asylum Package I), the regulation marked a 
significant	departure	from	previous	labor	migration	policy	and	has	since	been	dubbed	“new	territory”	by	some	
experts.4 Against the backdrop of large numbers of asylum applicants from the six Western Balkan countries 
with almost no chance of obtaining asylum, and just as refugees and asylum seekers from Syria and the Middle 
East were passing through the “Balkan-route” towards Northern Europe, it was tied to discussions to declare 
the Balkan States “safe countries of origin.” Within the legislative package, the Western Balkan Regulation 
opened up new legal pathways to citizens from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, 
Macedonia, and Serbia by greatly reducing hurdles to labor market access that apply to other third-country 
nationals.	Specifically,	the	regulation	essentially	opened	the	German	labor	market	to	all	skill	and	qualification	
levels,	including	low-skilled	migrants,	as	it	does	not	set	minimum	language	or	professional	qualification	
requirements.	The	only	requisite	is	to	have	a	job	offer	by	an	employer	in	Germany	willing	to	hire	for	a	job	for	
which no eligible person in Germany can be found.5 The regulation itself was set up as a temporary measure 
for	a	five-year	period	from	November	2015	to	2020.
Politicians have invoked the Western Balkan Regulation as a success story and have even referred to it 
as a potential model to follow for other regions or countries. During her annual summer press interview 
in July 2018, Chancellor Merkel called it a “prototype for arrangements with other countries.”6 Other 
politicians have argued to apply the Western Balkan model to North African states.7 The head of the 
faction of Germany’s Free Democrats (FDP), Stephan Tomae, has similarly called it the “right instrument 
to facilitate labor market migration while simultaneously reducing a backlog in the asylum application 
system.”8 Since the time of its enactment, politicians emphasized either its potential contribution to the 
reducing the numbers of asylum applications from the region, or its supposed benefits to a German 
economy in need of labor migrants. The regulation, however, has not been uncontentious. Specifically, 
criticism levied against the regulation concerns the question of whether migration under the regulation 
actually matches the needs of German labor market demand, and a growing unease among some policy 
makers, as cases of real or alleged misuse of the rule have surfaced. 
There is a lot to learn from the Western Balkan Regulation and its first results, especially when 
considering new “legal pathways” applications. While asylum applications from the Western Balkan 
countries did decrease, and the regulation was frequently used in 2016 and 2017, given the complexity 
of the policy environment at the time and the number of policies that took shape simultaneously, 
it is impossible to determine conclusively how much the regulation contributed to reducing the 
number of asylum applications from the region exactly. It is nevertheless very plausible that it did. 
The implementation further offers valuable lessons and potential building blocks for any future 
consideration of opening new labor migration channels, including in the low-skilled sector, to address 
irregular migration and when considering applying the Western Balkan “model” to other countries and 
regions.
4 	 Burkert,	Carola	und	Marianne	Haase.	(2017).	Westbalkanregelung: Ein neues Modell für die Migrationssteuerung? P.1. Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2zpVGVO 
5 	 Exceptions	exist	for	jobs	in	certain	regulated	sectors	in	Germany.	Here,	minimum	qualifications	must	be	equivalent	of	those	
of the sector regulations.
6 	 Die Welt (7.29.2018). Wird das migrationspolitische Experiment noch ausgeweitet? Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2NVWUu6 
7 	 See:	Rheinische	Post.	(10.06.2017).	Union und FDP bieten Grünen Einwanderungsdeal an. Retrieved from  
https://bit.ly/2Jubpmn and Frankfurter Allgemeine. (7.07.2017). Ausländer müssen lange auf Arbeitsvisum warten. Retrieved 
from https://bit.ly/2u3KKIs 
8 	 Die	Welt	(7.29.2018).	Wird das migrationspolitische Experiment noch ausgeweitet? Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2NVWUu6
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2. BORN IN CRISIS:  
THE WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION 
AS A GRAND POLITICAL BARGAIN
In November 2015, new labor market channels for nationals of the six Western Balkan states were opened 
through the Western Balkan Regulation as the German Asylum Package I entered into force. Known as 
section 26.2 (§26.2) of the German Employment Regulation (Beschäftigungsverordnung), the regulation was 
limited	to	5	years	(until	2020)	and	was	not	tied	to	any	minimum	skill	level	or	formal	qualifications,	nor	did	
it have any German language requirements. Applicants from the Western Balkans can receive a temporary 
work visa for Germany if they have an employment contract that adheres to German labor laws and 
minimum wage standards, and which has passed through a “priority check” by the employment agency 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) ensuring that there are no other eligible applicants in Germany available to take 
the job (Gleichwertigkeits- und Vorrangprüfung).9 In order to understand how this regulation made it into 
the	package	in	the	first	place,	and	the	current	controversies	and	debates	it	has	sparked,	it	is	necessary	to	
provide some key context on the political developments leading up to autumn 2015.
Germany has long been a country of destination for people from the Western Balkans, beginning 
with the official guest worker programs with former Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s and again as a 
safe harbor for those fleeing the Balkan wars of the 1990s and early 2000s.10 Since then, reasons for 
continued migration from the region have included a mix of reactions to a dire economic situation, 
unstable political situation, and in the case of Roma, social exclusion.11,12 Since 2010, there had been a 
steady increase of Western Balkan citizens arriving on German territory and filing for asylum of which 
only under 1% of applicants qualified for some form of protection.13 The total number of applications 
rose continuously from 17,476 in 2012, to 44,199 people in 2014, to 120,882 in 2015.14 In the case of 
Albania, the number of first time asylum applicants increased 40 fold from 1,247 in 2013 to 53,805 in 
2015 (see figure 2).15  
9 	 This	check	includes	giving	preference	to	Germans,	EU	citizens,	and	other	third	country	nationals,	including	asylum	seekers	
that are in Germany with a valid work authorization.
10 	Berlin	Institut	für	Bevölkerung	und	Entwicklung.	(2017).	Beschäftigung und Migration in der Region Westbalkan. Übersicht der 
Wanderungsbewegungen und Arbeitsmärkte. P.2. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2MAmxAV
11 	Henkel,	Felix	and	Bernd	Hoppe.	(2015).	Flucht und Migration. Debattenbeiträge aus den Ländern des Westbalkans. P.17. Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/1YUtZI1
12 	European	Asylum	and	Support	Office.	(May	2015).	Asylum Applicants from the Western Balkans: Comparative analysis of trends, 
push-pull factors and responses- update. P.11-14. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2K2VJvN According to information submitted to 
the	European	Asylum	and	Support	Office	(EASO),	Germany	noted	that	90%	of	the	asylum	applicants	from	Serbia	until	2014	
were Roma, and about 60% of those from Albania. 
13 	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2015).	Migrationsprofil Westbalkan: Ursachen, Herausforderungen und 
Lösungsansätze. P. 5. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/1X8krbU
14 	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Antrags-,	Entscheidungs-	und	Bestandsstatistik:	Westbalkanstaaten.	
15 	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Antrags-,	Entscheidungs-	und	Bestandsstatistik:	Albanien.	Information	
obtained directly from BAMF upon request.
2.1. DETERIORATING CONDITIONS IN THE 
WESTERN BALKANS, RISING ASYLUM APPLICATIONS
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From 2012 to 2015, applications for protection from all Western Balkan states accounted for about a 
quarter of all applications in Germany (see figure 1). By 2015, amid the high numbers of new asylum-
seekers and refugees from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, reducing the numbers of arrivals from the six 
Western Balkan states had become a political priority for the German government.
Figure 1: Percentage of Western Balkan nationals of all first-time applications for asylum and 
other forms of protection in Germany (total numbers)
Figure 2: Development of first-time asylum applications in Germany from the six Western 
Balkan countries 2012-2017
Source:	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Antrags-,	Entscheidungs-	und	Bestandsstatistik:	Westbalkanstaaten.	
Own compilation. 
Sources:	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2017.	P.9.;	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	
Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Antrags-,	Entscheidungs-	und	Bestandsstatistik:	Westbalkanstaaten.	Own	compilation.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
800 000
700 000
600 000
500 000
400 000
300 000
200 000
100 000
  0 23%
41.332
17%
45.741
27%
64.539
24%
109.580
26%
173.072
27%
441.899
6%
198.397
5%
722.370
From Western Balkan Total
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
60 000
50 000
40 000
30 000
20 000
10 000
         0
Albania
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Kosovo
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
12 CREATING LEGAL PATHWAYS TO REDUCE IRREGULAR MIGRATION? WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM GERMANY’S “WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION”
Still struggling with political and economic transformation processes, the poorest region of Europe was 
hit hard by the financial crisis of 2008; high unemployment rates, particularly among the youth, have 
improved only slightly since.16 Coupled with education and labor market systems in dire need of reform, 
leaving the country has become one of few viable options for anyone looking for a better living standard. 
About 45% of Albanians, Bosnians and Montenegrins, 30% of Kosovars and Macedonians, and a little 
under 20% of Serbians currently live outside their home country.17 
The weak post-2008 economic recovery of Italy, Greece, and Slovenia limited previously available 
options for seasonal work and redirected labor migrants from the Western Balkans towards other 
countries.18 The sizeable diasporas already present in Germany and other European countries provide 
active networks that further help to attract and situate family members or other newcomers. 
Additional factors provided 
incentives to move and 
contributed to the numbers of 
people from these countries 
seeking asylum to climb 
continuously. The EU’s gradual 
visa liberalization19 made it easier 
to enter EU territory. In 2014, 
severe floods in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and a government 
crisis in Kosovo for the second 
half of 2014 after challenging 
parliamentary elections also 
added to a sense of political 
and economic frustration and 
hopelessness. Long asylum 
procedures in Germany were 
used by some applicants as 
a temporary escape from dire circumstances at home, especially in winter.20 In a recent study, some 
asylum seekers mentioned that they realized their chances of obtaining asylum were virtually non-
existent, but they came anyway because they were barely able to obtain basic sustenance in their 
home country (in terms of paying for food or heating) or provide direly needed medical treatment to 
their children.21 Others were promised by smugglers that they would get a job. In 2012, the German 
Constitutional Court ruled to increase the minimum amount of financial support for each asylum 
16  in 2017, the unemployment rate stood at around 15% for Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, 20% for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and 30 % for Kosovo. The rate for youth unemployment is particularly high, at 45.5% for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 32.4% 
in Albania, and as high as 50.7% in Kosovo which, with a median age of thirty, has the youngest population in the Western 
Balkans or Europe. See World Bank. (2018a). Western Balkans Regular Economic Report: Vulnerabilities, Slow Growth,  
P. 67. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2L3fEHn and World Bank. (2018b). Western Balkans Labor Market Trends 2018. P. 80-84. 
Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2Njk1Pj
17 	Berlin	Institut	für	Bevölkerung	und	Entwicklung.	(2017).	P.	2.
18 	Italy,	for	instance,	decreased	contingents	for	low	skilled	seasonal	workers	from	98,000	in	2010	to	18,000	in	2013.	Berlin	
Institut	für	Bevölkerung	und	Entwicklung.	(2017).	P.	16.
19 	Starting	in	December	2009	for	Macedonians,	Montenegrins	and	Serbs	and	in	December	2010	for	Albanians	and	natives	of	
Bosnia and Herzegovina. So far, only Kosovars have not yet been granted visa liberalization. While the visa liberalization 
itself	is	not	a	reason	for	an	increase	in	asylum	applications,	it	allowed	for	an	easier	entry	into	EU	countries	to	file	for	asylum.
20 	European	Asylum	and	Support	Office.	(May	2015).	P.	19-22.	
21 	Forschungsbereich	des	Sachverständigenrat	deutscher	Stiftungen	für	Integration	und	Migration.	(November	2017).	 
Wie gelingt Integration? Asylsuchende über ihre Lebenslagen und Teilhabeperspektiven in Deutschland. Pp. 80. Eine Studie des 
SVR-Forschungsbereichs und der Robert Bosch Stiftung,Berlin. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2jU990L
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applicant during the asylum process.22 In Kosovo, a new agreement with Serbia in 2014 introduced a 
new Kosovar ID card, which made it possible for Kosovars to cross the border to Serbia, eliminating one 
barrier along the path to Hungary and Germany.23 The flight from Kosovo was particularly large and 
abrupt, and as one government official in Pristina noted, “the exodus caught everyone in the country by 
surprise.” Smuggling networks in certain cities facilitated rumors about prosperity abroad and offered 
transport, and at the height of the crisis, busloads of people were leaving every day from Pristina to 
Belgrade. Some younger people thought it would be an adventure. Whole families – even people with 
jobs – sold their houses, buying into the rumors that “Germany was granting economic asylum.”
Importantly, the large exodus from the region was already in place when record numbers of people
arriving from Syria and the wider Middle East put a spotlight on the so-called Balkan route, the
region becoming a mass transit route in addition to already being a major source of irregular
migration to the EU and Germany.
Facing rapidly rising number of people entering Germany in 2014 and especially 2015, the German 
government took a series of political and legislative steps to address migration from the Southeast, 
including a number of meetings between German government officials who met with their counterparts 
in the Western Balkan countries to voice concerns and look for ideas.24 German embassies ran 
information campaigns in the region advising that residents had poor chances of being granted 
asylum, as did the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). The German Information Point for 
Migration, Vocational Training and Career (DIMAK), began operations in Pristina, Kosovo in May 2015. 
The German ambassador and the Kosovar president travelled to municipalities to convey dissuading 
messages and returns of people arriving at the airport were publicized and aired on (live) TV, both 
in Germany and Kosovo. In order to counter false rumors and to discourage people from leaving 
for Germany, the Kosovo Ministry of European Integration of Kosovo initiated several information 
campaigns via town hall meetings and field visits to remote villages where large numbers of asylum 
seekers had come from.
At home, the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees was assigned 300 more staff in 2014 to address 
the increase in asylum applications. Debates in parliament intensified over how to reduce the number 
of asylum seekers and to return those already in Germany whose claims for asylum and protection were 
denied. In November 2014, the German parliament declared Macedonia, Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina 
“safe countries of origin,” a designation that served a twofold purpose: first, it served as a deterrent by 
making it clear to citizens of these “safe” countries that the chances of receiving some form of residence 
permit for applicants was very rare (it was under 1%), and second, it allowed for speedier processing of 
asylum claims and faster deportations, an imperative at the time for a German asylum system operating 
at its limits. In general, efforts by government agencies at the state and federal level were concerted to 
review all applications from nationals of the six Balkan states before other regions of the world. 
In 2015, the situation in Germany intensified as more and more people arrived via the Balkan route. 
Following German chancellor Merkel’s joint decision with then Austrian chancellor Faymann to allow 
22 	Frankfurter	Allgemeine.	(7.18.2012).	Karlsruhe: Mehr Geld für Asylbewerber. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2u3kn5s. The 
regulation stipulated that asylum seekers must receive the same minimum standard amount that applies to Germans 
receiving	state	subsidies.	The	financial	support	level	for	asylum	seekers	had	not	been	adjusted	since	1993.
23 	As	of	September	2018,	Kosovo	is	still	the	only	country	of	the	Western	Balkans	that	does	not	have	visa	liberalization	to	travel	
to the Schengen area.
24 The	German	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Interior	and	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	Republic	of	Kosovo	met	in	Berlin	
in March 2014; the Minister of the Interior met with the Albanian Prime Minister in July 2014 in Tirana; the Ministers of the 
Interior	from	Serbia	and	Germany	met	in	Belgrade	that	same	month.	See	European	Asylum	and	Support	Office.	(May	2015).	
P. 29.
2.2. IN SEARCH OF A POLICY TO REDUCE NUMBERS
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Figure 3: Timeline Policy Context
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people arriving from Hungary via Austria to pass into Germany,25 people continued to come in greater 
and greater numbers over the following weeks and months. By the beginning of 2016, the situation in 
the Western Balkans had reached new dimensions with high levels of asylum seekers from mostly Syria, 
Iraq or Afghanistan transiting through the region and increasing the strain on the Balkan countries as 
well as Austria. The ensuing Balkan Summit in Vienna in February of 2016 added stricter border control 
measures and cooperation between the countries, in effect “closing” the Balkan route. A longer time in 
the making, the EU and Turkey agreed on the EU- Turkey statement in March 2016, which also slowed 
down migration from Turkey to the EU.26
THE GERMAN DOMESTIC DEBATE AND A GRAND POLITICAL BARGAIN
As the exponential increase of asylum seekers and migrants met an ill-prepared and overburdened 
German bureaucracy and increasingly also fueled political tension at home, the German parliament 
responded by introducing two legislative packages: Asylum Package I, which came into effect in October 
2015, and Asylum Package II, which entered into force in March 2016 (after discussions had begun in 
November 2015). Both packages were aimed to speed up asylum procedures in general and contained 
mostly restrictive measures, especially for asylum seekers from safe countries of origin. In the attempt 
to ease concerns of benefit abuse the packages also allowed each German state to hand out non-cash 
items rather than cash payments during the asylum procedure. The final version of package I included 
the provision to add Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo to the list of safe countries of origin. It also 
included the Western Balkan Regulation. 
The Western Balkan Regulation is the exception within the packages. To include new immigration 
pathways for all skill levels, including unskilled workers with no minimum qualification requirements 
was not an obvious or unquestionable measure. There were and are certainly different reasons why it 
could have made sense to call for legal pathways provided in the regulation as one sensible component 
in addressing irregular 
movement of people coming 
to Germany. But there are also 
political reasons – and no clear 
migration logic was applied 
consistently in what was a 
political process to include the 
Western Balkan Regulation. 
Politically, the more liberal 
parties needed to include 
something that seemed 
open and positive to make 
two legislation packages that were otherwise very restrictive toward asylum and immigration more 
palatable. As part of discussions placing Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo on the safe country of origin 
list and the restrictive measures of Asylum package I, a debate was raging among Germany’s left-leaning 
parties, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens. As a governing coalition partner, the SPD needed 
to get its members onboard. More importantly, passing the legislative package required the approval 
of Germany’s upper house, the Bundesrat, which consists of the individual German Länder or states. To 
pass the new legislation, the support of at least one Green co-governed state was a necessity. Green 
opposition to the designation, however, remained firm, and on August 18, 2015, the party signed a 
joint position paper against expanding the list of safe countries of origin.27 Their critique called it pure 
political symbolism, and the paper called for “legal pathways” to the German labor market. In doing so, 
it in fact reiterated an idea first floated by the SPD earlier that month, when state ministers and party 
25 Under	the	Dublin	III	regulation,	the	EU	member	state	where	a	person	first	entered	EU	territory	is	responsible	for	processing	
the	asylum	applications.	This	decision,	in	effect,	suspended	Dublin	temporarily.
26 European	Council.	(18.03.2016).	EU-Turkey	Statement.	Press	Release.	Retrieved	from	https://bit.ly/2C0EdiO
27 Spiegel	Online.	(8.18.2015).	Grüne	gegen	Ausweitung	sicherer	Herkunftsländer.	Retrieved	from	https://bit.ly/2KY2OgK
The Western Balkan Regulation is 
the exception within the packages. 
To include new immigration path-
ways for unskilled workers was not 
an obvious or uncontroversial mea-
sure.
16 CREATING LEGAL PATHWAYS TO REDUCE IRREGULAR MIGRATION? WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM GERMANY’S “WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION”
leader Sigmar Gabriel in a phone call had agreed to push the idea of opening up additional pathways 
for employment from these countries.28 In the final negotiations at the Bundesrat level, these legal 
pathways were part of the package.29 Including access to the labor market had made the other parts 
of the package more acceptable to SPD and Green party members and supporters, giving the image, 
somewhat correctly, of retaining some openness to immigration and offering a humane alternative for 
those people desperate enough to migrate from the region. On October 2, 2015, the package passed 
the upper house. For conservatives, the openness of the Western Balkan Regulation was a necessary 
compromise, and some also identified a potential economic benefit in the measure. At least implicitly, 
politicians seemed to argue two causal assumptions: first, that the people applying for asylum would 
be the same people applying for a work visa, i.e. that it would at least in part “re-route” migrants from 
irregular asylum application system to legal channels. And second, that it would also be in line with 
needs of the German labor market. At the time of negotiations, the minister of Hesse, Volker Bouffier 
(CDU), approved of discussing the concept because “by providing work visas we can help exactly those 
people that leave the Western Balkans due to economic reasons and that come to Germany with valid 
work contracts,” adding that the German economy would also benefit.30 
Others were more skeptical. The German Associations of Employers (BDA), for instance, remained 
unconvinced of the regulation, stating that “from the beginning, we have been skeptical towards special 
immigration rules for people from the Western Balkans that are not based on specific needs of the 
German labor market.“ Rather, they argued, the focus should be on including recognized refugees into 
the labor market.31
The main motivating factor for including the regulation was thus a political bargain and not a clear 
migration policy logic. The blurring of rationales may have made sense politically to reach a compromise, 
but it complicated parts of the implementation process and evaluation of its usefulness as a migration 
management tool. The following section looks at first results of the regulation and points to lessons 
we can draw from this novel experiment, especially as policy makers consider it as model for future 
arrangements.
28 	Deutsche	Welle.	(8.6.2015).	SPD	schlägt	Arbeitsvisa	für	Westbalkan-Flüchtlinge	vor.	Retrieved	from	https://bit.ly/2upwzNh
29 	Süddeutsche	Zeitung.	(9.24.2015).	Grüne	Kompromisse.	Retrieved	from	https://bit.ly/2J7pbLu
30 	Deutsche	Welle.	(8.6.2015).	SPD schlägt Arbeitsvisa für Westbalkan-Flüchtlinge vor. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2upwzNh
31 	Berliner	Morgenpost.	(3.10.2016).	Arbeits-Visa: Noch kommen wenige Menschen vom Westbalkan. Retrieved from 
 https://bit.ly/2NBqmGB.
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3. THE WESTERN BALKAN  
REGULATION EXPERIMENT:  
FIRST FACTS AND FIGURES
It has now been almost three years exactly since the Western Balkan Regulation entered into force 
with Asylum package I and essentially opened the German labor market in an unprecedented way to 
citizens of the Western Balkans. Before November 2015 there were very limited options to get a work 
visa in Germany. One either needed to be a well-paid specialist (blue card) or be a professional in a 
field in which Germany suffered a labor shortage (shortlist professions, such as care workers). With the 
regulation though, as stated above, no minimum skill or language requirements were in place. Further, 
the right to apply for a work visa under §26.2 is only available for someone who has not received any 
benefits under the asylum system in Germany 24 months prior to applying for a work permit.32 
Until October 31, 2017, a so-called pre-approval process was in place through the federal employment 
agency, which was intended to speed up the visa process at embassies. In theory, embassies would 
not need to check every work contract themselves, as the pre-approval by the agency meant that the 
presented contract was deemed legitimate. But the pre-approval process encountered a number of 
problems, the most crucial being that processing times at embassies often stretched beyond the six-
month validity of the pre-approvals. The process was stopped as of November 1, 2017 and the embassy 
is now the first point of contact for the entire application process.33 The fact that the initial set-up of the 
regulation included a pre-approval of work contracts by the federal employment agency is significant, 
because the collected pre-approval applications provide a unique glimpse into what the actual interest in 
these types of work visas were in terms of scale (application numbers), both by employers and workers. 
Since November 2017, embassies have only collected numbers for visas issued, so we do not know how 
many visas were sought and denied, and thus can no longer gauge the general level of interest. 
32  One	suggestion	initially	floated	by	the	SPD	was	capping	the	number	of	available	work	visas	at	20,000	per	year,	a	cap	not	
included	in	the	final	rule.
33 	In	practice	the	pre-approval	did	not	speed	up	the	visa	process	as	embassies	still	needed	to	run	their	own	checks	of	both	the	
application and work contracts. In some cases, the work contract presented at the embassies was not the one pre-approved 
by the BA. Also, often people only received an appointment with the embassy when the pre-approval, valid for six months, 
had	already	expired,	and	the	job	offer	had	potentially	been	revoked.
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Step 1 Person applies for job in Germany from country of origin
Step 2 Employer provides contract to person they want to hire
*Step 2a until Oct. 31st, 2017: Employer sends contract to Federal Employment Agency (BA) for review  
  and pre-approval of contract to speed up visa application process. 
  after November 1, 2017: this step was eliminated as the pre-approval did not lead to a faster   
  processing time at the embassies
Step 3  Person books embassy appointment online (different waiting times apply depending on the   
  embassy), then presents paperwork at appointment.
 
Step 4  Embassy checks with:
a) Federal Agency for Administration (Bundesverwaltungsamt/BVA) whether person pre-registered 
filed for asylum seekers in Germany before (via the Central Register of Foreigners) and if there is  
a security threat information on the person (e.g. through Visa Warning System or Schengen)  
b) Foreigner’s Registration Office (Ausländerbehörde/ABH) whether person previously filed for 
asylum. If yes, when asylum benefits were received. If person received benefits in the past  
24 months, no visa is issued, even if the person repaid all benefits received. Exceptions apply 
for those who filed for asylum after January 1, 2015 and before October 24, 2015, who were 
in Germany on October 24th with a temporary suspension of deportation (Duldung) or who 
were subject of removal (ausreisepflichtig) and left immediately (generally before January 2016, 
exceptions apply). 
c) Federal Employment Agency (BA) checks whether other Germans, EU citizens, foreigners 
with residence permit, asylum seekers or those with temporary suspension of deportation with 
employment permit are available to do the job and should be given priority (Vorrangprüfung).  
The agency also checks contracts within their mandate and capacity concerning plausibility.
In case the embassy notices irregularities or suspects fraud, it can relay this information to the 
foreigner’s registration office (ABH) to suggest limiting the duration of the residence permit and 
to check on the situation within a year’s time. The embassy also checks whether the wage level 
can sufficiently sustain the potential employee’s stay in Germany (especially in case of part time 
contracts). 
Embassy can request further documents and new appointment (additional waiting times apply).
Step 5  In case of positive clearance during all checks, a visa is provided for legal entry to Germany.
Step 6 Person moves to Germany to job location and registers with local Foreigner’s Registration   
  Office (ABH) which issues the residence permit. The duration of the work visa differs on a case   
  by case basis, but in Berlin, for instance, it is typically for three years.
Step 7 Person can begin to work. After two years, he or she is allowed to change employers. However,  
  in interviews several people told us that the two year window is in effect not checked, and   
  people may well change employment earlier. 
Figure 4: How to come to Germany through the Western Balkan Regulation- processing steps
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MORE PRE-APPROVALS BY THE EMPLOYMENT AGENCY THAN VISAS ISSUED
Overall, the employment agency received a total of 147,863 work contracts for pre-approval for 2016-
2017, of which roughly 80% percent or 117,123 were finally pre-approved (meaning that the labor 
contract matched German standards and it passed the Vorrangprüfung).34 However, of these 117,123 
pre-approvals, only 44,093 (38%) received visas at German consulates during the same period (potential 
reasons for this notable difference are explained below).
Table 1: Total number of pre-approvals and visas issued as a result of §26.2. (2016-2017)
Sources:	Bundesagentur	für	Arbeit.	(2017).	Zustimmungen u. Ablehnungen zur Arbeitsaufnahme von Drittstaatsangehörigen – 
Deutschland, Länder und Regionaldirektionen (Jahreszahlen und Zeitreihen) – Dezember 2017. Retrieved from  
https://bit.ly/2L8NhLP; Institute for Employment Research (IAB). (2017). Westbalkanregelung: Arbeit statt Asyl?; Deutscher 
Bundestag. (2018). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. Andre Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, 
weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE – Arbeitsvisa aus dem Westbalkan im zweiten Halbjahr 2017. Drucksache 19/1422. 
Own compilation.
SIMULTANEOUS DROP IN FIRST TIME ASYLUM APPLICATIONS
There is indeed a coinciding significant drop of asylum applications, while applications for work permits 
rose (though, as mentioned before, the drop also coincides with multiple other restrictive policies).  
The total amount of first time applications for asylum from Western Balkans dropped significantly from 
120,882 in 2015 to 34,360 in 2016, and then to 10,915 in 2017 (see figure 5).35 
34 	Bundesagentur	für	Arbeit.	(2017).	Zustimmungen u. Ablehnungen zur Arbeitsaufnahme von Drittstaatsangehörigen – 
Deutschland, Länder und Regionaldirektionen ( Jahreszahlen und Zeitreihen) – Dezember 2017. Retrieved from  
https://bit.ly/2L8NhLP
35 	Source:	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Antrags-, Entscheidungs- und Bestandsstatistik:
 Westbalkanstaaten.
WORK CONTRACTS 
SUBMITTED TO 
EMPLOYMENT 
AGENCY FOR REVIEW 
UNDER § 26.2
PRE-APPROVALS
ISSUED
PRE-APPROVALS 
DENIED
VISAS ISSUED
PER § 26.2
2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016 2017 2016
Total 94,280 53,583  74,577  42,546  19,703  11,037 25,341 18,752
Albania 8,235 3,933   6,053   2,977   2,182   956 2,796 1,228
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
21,206 13,889  17,220  11,330   3,986   2,559 5,933 5,581
Kosovo 36,245 18,182  28,816  14,419   7,429   3,763 6,012 5,102
Macedonia 11,452 6,213   8,918   4,746   2,534   1,467 5,167 2,635
Montenegro 1,839 1,313   1,433   1,012   406   301 856 678
Serbia 15,301 10,050  12,135   8,059   3,166   1,991 4,577 3,528
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Figure 5: First time asylum applications decrease, applications for pre-approval increase
Sources:	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Antrags-,	Entscheidungs-	und	Bestandsstatistik:	Westbalkanstaaten.	 
Annual	figures;	Bundesagentur	für	Arbeit.	(2017).	Zustimmungen u. Ablehnungen zur Arbeitsaufnahme von Drittstaatsangehörigen – 
Deutschland, Länder und Regionaldirektionen (Jahreszahlen und Zeitreihen) - Dezember 2017. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2L8NhLP; 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB). (2017). Westbalkanregelung: Arbeit statt Asyl?; Deutscher Bundestag. (2018). Antwort der 
Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. Andre Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, weiterer Abgeordneter und der 
Fraktion DIE LINKE - Arbeitsvisa aus dem Westbalkan im zweiten Halbjahr 2017. Drucksache 19/1422. Own compilation.
RESULTS DIFFER ACCORDING TO COUNTRY
There are notable differences between individual countries. In the case of Albania, for instance, the high 
numbers for first time asylum applications did not result in similarly high numbers for pre-approval 
work applications. For Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand, applications through the regulation far 
outstripped previous requests for asylum in Germany, while Kosovo had both a high number of asylum 
seekers and applications through the Western Balkan Regulation. Multiple factors, such as diaspora size 
in Germany or labor profile of migrants, could provide plausible explanations for these differences, but 
we cannot know for sure.36 
36 	One	hypothesis	to	explain	this	could	be	that	there	is	a	larger	number	of	nationals	from	Bosnia-Herzegovina	(180,950	people	
in 2017) residing in Germany than from Albania (48,705 in 2017) who could help attract or employ their fellow nationals. 
However, this hypothesis would have to be tested and might not stand as Kosovars, the second largest group of citizens in 
Germany, also have family ties to Albania.
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Figure 6: Albania, high number of asylum applications, lower number of applications for 
pre-approval
Figure 7: Bosnia-Herzegovina, lower numbers of asylum applications, higher number of 
applications for pre-approval 
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Figure 8: Kosovo, high number of asylum applications, high number of applications 
for pre-approval
Sources	for	figures	6-8:	Bundesamt	für	Migration	und	Flüchtlinge.	(2018).	Antrags-,	Entscheidungs-	und	Bestandsstatistik:	
Westbalkanstaaten.	Annual	figures;	Bundesagentur	für	Arbeit.	(2017).	Zustimmungen u. Ablehnungen zur Arbeitsaufnahme von 
Drittstaatsangehörigen - Deutschland, Länder und Regionaldirektionen (Jahreszahlen und Zeitreihen) - Dezember 2017. Retrieved 
from https://bit.ly/2L8NhLP; Institute for Employment Research (IAB). (2017). Westbalkanregelung: Arbeit statt Asyl?; Deutscher 
Bundestag. (2018). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. Andre Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, 
weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE - Arbeitsvisa aus dem Westbalkan im zweiten Halbjahr 2017. Drucksache 19/1422. 
Own compilation.
MANY OF PRE-APPROVALS ARE IN THE LOW- OR UNSKILLED “HELPER” CATEGORY AND 
CONSTRUCTION AND HOSPITALITY SECTOR
As mentioned, one of the more surprising features of the Western Balkan Regulation was that it 
was open to all skill levels, including low-skilled migrants. In terms of skill level, of all work contracts 
submitted to the employment for pre-approval, approximately half fell within the “helper” (Helfer) 
category (unskilled or low-skilled jobs), while another 46% were for some degree of skilled labor 
(Fachkräfte)37. In terms of economic sector, most requests for pre-approval in 2017 were in the 
construction and hospitality sector. 
37 	Bundesagentur	für	Arbeit:	Statistik	(2013).	Methodische Hinweise zum Anforderungsniveau nach dem Zielberuf der 
auszuübenden Tätigkeit. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2KZoWag
	 There	are	four	skill	levels	as	defined	by	the	employment	agency,	however,	they	do	not	neatly	correspond	with	the	general	
usage in everyday language: 1) “helper” level (Helfer): simple and routine work, requires no or very low knowledge of job, 
does not require any formal education- this also includes people with a one year education who e.g. are helping in the 
health sector or on construction sites; 2) skilled level (Fachkraft): 2-3 years of job/vocational training needed to do the job, 
in the public usage and perception, skilled level can also contain those of level 3, specialists; 3) Specialist level (Spezialisten): 
usually 4 years of university education or education of a master craftsman. 4) Expert level (Experten): highly complex 
activities including leadership and upper management tasks, minimum of 4 years university education, potentially also PhD
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Figure 9: Pre-Approvals by skill level 2016-2017, in percentage
Source: Deutscher Bundestag. (2018). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. Andre 
Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE - Arbeitsvisa aus dem Westbalkan im zweiten Halbjahr 2017. 
Drucksache	19/1422.	P.12	&	15.	Own	calculation.
Figure 10: Pre-Approvals of work contract under the Western Balkan Regulation by economic 
sector 2017, in percentage
Source: Deutscher Bundestag. (2018). Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. Andre 
Hahn, Gökay Akbulut, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE - Arbeitsvisa aus dem Westbalkan im zweiten Halbjahr 2017. 
Drucksache 19/1422. P.24. Own calculation.
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In its first years, a significant drop of the number of asylum applications from the Western Balkans did 
coincide with the use of the Western Balkan Regulation. However, multiple events and initiatives of 
the German governments and governments in the region were happening at the same time, making it 
impossible to determine what role specifically the Western Balkan Regulation played in bringing down 
numbers of asylum seekers. The sharp drop in asylum applications also coincides with the harsher 
measures of the asylum packages and faster processing times, as well as with the closure of Balkan 
route. However, even with this uncertainty and its inconsistencies, §26.2 has provided several elements 
of a migration management experiment that offers important lessons for further consideration of 
similar policies. This is particularly important as the general assumption remains in place that legal 
pathways are a (at least partial) answer to irregular migration, and as German politicians are keen to 
replicate the Western Balkan Regulation elsewhere.
Even with this uncertainty 
around the numbers and the 
regulation’s inconsistencies, §26.2 
provides a migration management 
experiment that offers important 
lessons for further consideration 
of similar policies.
25 CREATING LEGAL PATHWAYS TO REDUCE IRREGULAR MIGRATION? WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM GERMANY’S “WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION”
In the statistics now available for the Western Balkan Regulation, the difference between the number of 
pre-approvals made by the employment agency and the actual visas issued by the German embassies 
and consulates is most striking. In all countries, pre-approvals significantly outstripped visas issued by 
the six German consulates. In 2016, only 18,752 visas were issued out of 42,543 pre-approved work 
contracts. In 2017, the visas issued rose to 25,341 out of 74, 577 pre-approved by the employment 
agency (see table 1).38 Some of our interviewees suspected the German Foreign Office of purposefully 
undermining the original regulation by restricting access to the labor market through their bureaucratic 
processes.39 Our research indicates, however, that it was rather a matter of logistics and capacity, as 
the process of the regulation put a great burden on the visa personnel to verify information of the 
applications through §26.2 (and not enough on adequate control mechanisms in Germany).
First, the personnel at the embassies was originally not equipped to deal with the large increase in visas 
under §26.2. The staff at several embassies since the beginning of the regulation was only minimally 
increased, adding 1 person in Sarajevo, 3 in Pristina, and 2 in Skopje.40 As a result, the waiting times for 
visa applications went up significantly at the consulates. While in Podgorica applicants did not have to 
wait, waiting times elsewhere stretched into many months: four months in Skopje, six in Tirana, and 
seven months in Belgrade. Applicants had to wait as long as a year or more in Pristina and Sarajevo.41 As 
the consulates in these regions also deal with all kinds of other visas – for work, family reunification, or 
in the case of Kosovo, with basic Schengen visas for travel purposes – the regulation sometimes slowed 
down other forms of visas.42 In the case of Pristina, the addition of consulate personnel is still pending a 
building approval by local authorities to construct more office space. 
The long waiting times undermined one key component of the Western Balkan Regulation: that it was 
tied to a work contract and thus, at least in theory, linked to actual demands by German employers 
(including short term or temporary labor needs). As the employment agency approval was contingent 
upon no other eligible person in Germany available to take the job (priority check), long waiting times for 
the visa process effectively undermined this connection.  
38 	Deutscher	Bundestag,	Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ulla Jelpke, Dr. Andre Hahn, 
Gökay Akbulut, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE – Arbeitsvisa aus dem Westbalkan im zweiten Halbjahr 2017. 
Drucksache 19/1422. (2018). Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2zzUjEf
39 	Expert	and	practitioner	interviews,	Berlin.	
40 	Deutscher	Bundestag.	(2018).	P.	3.
41 	Ibid.	p.4
42 	Not	only	in	terms	of	staff	time,	but	also	applicants	crowded	toward	§26.2	visas:	some	Visa	applicants	who	would	have	
qualified	under	a	work	visa	under	§18.1	of	the	German	Employment	Regulation,	or	some	that	were	clear	family	reunification	
cases, applied via this new rule, in the hopes of receiving a faster visa for Germany.
4. A REGULATION MEETS REALITY: 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND 
LESSONS FROM ABROAD AND 
AT HOME
4.1. PROCESS DESIGN AND STAFFING SHORTAGES CAUSE IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
26 CREATING LEGAL PATHWAYS TO REDUCE IRREGULAR MIGRATION? WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM GERMANY’S “WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION”
Second, the original set-up with the pre-approval of the employment agency left the verification 
burden of checking whether the work contract plausibly matched the job requirements entirely to 
the embassies. Therefore, there may have been good reasons to deny a visa application even though 
the work contract had been pre-approved. Visa officers have discretionary mandates to, among other 
things, apply a “plausibility test.” 
Scrutiny of individual applicants 
in combination with a work 
contract could, for instance, 
show that the candidate was 
not a plausible hire for the 
job described in the work 
contract because she lacked the 
necessary qualifications for the 
job listed in the work contract.43 
Even if the regulation did not 
set minimum qualification 
levels, a history teacher still 
cannot do the job of an expert 
welder. Other examples voiced 
during our interviews were a company that had one employee the year before, and now applied for 50 
work visas at once (in which case the embassy would ask for more detailed checks from the agencies at 
home) or jobs that required frequent interaction in German, while the applicant clearly did not speak 
German. Other reasons for denying a visa could be formal (such as that the minimum wage for certain 
types of jobs is not met in the work contract, or that it is implausible that a person could live off their 
salary in Germany, for instance in the case of part-time work) or that the person applying was not 
allowed to enter Germany due to a previous misdemeanor or criminal charge (Einreisesperre).44 Finally, 
if the job in the contract required a minimum qualification in Germany, the equivalent degree of the 
applicant would need to be recognized as such, another review that also falls on embassies. 
Visa case workers have a great deal of discretion, so there certainly could be instances in which a case is 
unrightfully interpreted to the detriment of the applicant. But as information on denied applications is 
not systematically collected, it is not possible to determine the grounds for denials, or even how many 
visas via the Western Balkan Regulation were denied. We would however conclude that there was not a 
deliberate and systematic effort to keep the numbers of visas low.
43 	While	§26.2	does	not	set	a	minimum	qualification	level,	this	does	NOT	mean	that	there	are	not	minimum	qualifications	
necessary to conduct certain regulated jobs in Germany. A welder, for instance, would still need to have an equivalent 
qualification	of	a	welder	in	Germany.	Other	jobs,	such	as	basic	construction	workers,	on	the	other	hand,	would	not	need	
such	a	qualification.
44  Multiple Interviews in Pristina and Belgrade.
The long waiting times undermined 
one key component of the Western 
Balkan Regulation: that it was 
tied to a work contract and thus, 
at least in theory, linked to actual 
demands by German employers 
(including short term or temporary 
labor needs). 
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Many people in Germany we interviewed mentioned a sense of unease and raised concerns about fraud 
or abuse of the Western Balkan Regulation. However, as no systematic data collection is in place, we 
only have anecdotal evidence of such alleged “misuse.”
It is important to distinguish between different types of accusations of abuse of the rule (or ”Miss-
brauch”). On the one hand there is actual fraud or abuse as it pertains to the exploitation of migrant 
workers, actual working conditions, or jobs advertised. On the other hand, there are other cases where 
people other than the intended group made use of the regulation and it became, in the words of one 
interviewee, “an alternate route for extended family reunification.” This latter case is not illegal per se.
The first category, concerns about fraud and abuse, relate either to firms that do not really exist or 
contracts that are then not adhered to after the person starts work in Germany. In some cases the 
terms are simply changed (more hours, lower pay) or the employee is doing a different job altogether 
than what was indicated in the visa application. The employment agency did not record the number 
of times it checked on employees before it approved of the labor contracts according to §26.2.45 It did, 
however, conduct 3,500 reviews after the fact, and found in about 200 cases a suspicion of a crime 
or an administrative offense (Ordnungswidrigkeit). In the majority of these 200 cases the problem was 
that the actual work performed either did not correspond to labor conditions or to the tasks outlined 
in the original labor contract.46 There have been select reports of worker abuses in terms of pay, 
accommodation, or hours worked.47 
Other than these 3,500 cases, there is no systematic record of employers who made use of the Western 
Balkan Regulation, making monitoring nearly impossible. The German customs (Zoll) as part of their 
general mandate does conduct regular labor spot checks. According to customs figures from spot 
checks made in 2017, five of the six Western Balkan states were on the top 10 list of illegal workers 
(Schwarzarbeiter), though these were by definition not people working with contracts under the 
regulation.48 Concerns of abuse thus cannot easily be assuaged or confirmed because the regulation 
failed to set up a monitoring process for §26.2 workers, either by customs agents or others.
The second case, the idea that people are using the rule for something other than valid employee 
needs, is harder to judge. The main suspicion is that some people in Germany are hiring other family 
members.49 There is of course nothing wrong with hiring a family member for a job for which she is 
suitable, but the most common concern voiced was that family members might be creating fictional 
jobs for other family members, i.e. jobs that did not previously exist and are not needed. As some 
interviewees pointed out, hiring only trusted contacts is common practice in many Balkan states, and is 
thus a normal procedure (and should not be overinterpreted). It further allows for a safe recruitment 
process, and business owners who themselves have no ties to the Balkan states may also prefer to hire 
the recommended cousin of a current employee, and rely on these ties to make orientation on the job 
more seamless. None of this is illegal or even necessarily improper. The definition of misuse in this 
case would need to be discussed based on what the intended use of the regulation was. But as outlined 
above, beyond targeting nationals of the six Balkan countries, the intended use was always left vague.
45 	Deutscher	Bundestag.	(2018).	P.	6.
46 	Ibid.	
47  Die Welt.(7.29.2018). Wird das migrationspolitische Experiment noch ausgeweitet? Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2NVWUu6 
48 	Deutsche	Welle.	(2.1.2018).	Betrüger und Betrogene vom Balkan – Schwarzarbeit in Deutschland. Retrieved from  
https://bit.ly/2J6xnMf
49 	Interviewees	in	Pristina,	Belgrade	and	Berlin.
4.2. INSUFFICIENT VERIFICATION MECHANISMS AT HOME LEAD  
TO SUSPICIONS OF “MISUSE”
28 CREATING LEGAL PATHWAYS TO REDUCE IRREGULAR MIGRATION? WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM GERMANY’S “WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION”
Neither the employment agency nor the visa officers have the mandate or capacity to check every
suspicion of fraud or misuse, or indeed even most of them. This insufficient control mechanism
actually makes the potential for abuse of workers after arrival in Germany greater, and also
undermines the credibility of the rule itself. Most importantly, it seems that no agency in Germany
sees itself as responsible for the control element of the Western Balkan Regulation in particular. The
employment agency sees itself as a service provider for employers, not as an enforcement agency.
Customs checks the labor market and firms in general, but has no specific responsibility related to
the Western Balkan Regulation. As a result, the officials working for the consulates face the greatest
burden to somehow monitor potential abuse before the visa is issued. Reliable data collection or
monitoring would be needed to verify or discredit these accusations of different kinds of abuse or
“misuse.”
As outlined above, the Western Balkan Regulation came into being as a rushed political bargain, 
simultaneously as part of the goal to bring down asylum numbers while also proposing to open legal 
channels to the German labor market, based on the assumption that labor market needs would regulate 
the process. There was not a clear common understanding of how the regulation would specifically 
influence the scale and type of migration to Germany. 
If the assumption by policy makers was that because of legal pathways, fewer people would enter the 
asylum system, the implicit assumption was that in fact the people who had sought asylum or would 
be applying for asylum are the same people who would now take the opportunity provided by §26.2. 
However, neither the set up or monitoring of the regulation addresses this supposed logic. 
Most policymakers might not have been aware of the experiment they entered into at the time. Though 
understandable, this resulted in a lack of monitoring and collection of key data points that could have 
provided valuable evidence for evaluating the Western Balkan Regulation before it expires in 2020. Of 
the data available, the most interesting was embedded within the initial set-up itself, as it placed the 
job agency as the first respondent to requests from employers in the pre-approval process. This has 
provided an indication of the number of those interested in coming to Germany via this new rule, which 
is over 100,000 thus far. With the new process and the consulates as the first point of review, we will no 
longer have even this reference 
number. 
Thanks to the initial set up and 
job agency numbers we can ask 
some questions on process and 
efficacy and identify some of the 
information that we would need 
to draw further conclusions: 
4.3. A MIGRATION MANAGEMENT EXPERIMENT, BUT WITHOUT MONITORING  
AND EVALUATION
If the assumption by policy 
makers was that because of legal 
pathways, fewer people would 
enter the asylum system, the 
implicit assumption was that in 
fact the people who would be 
applying for asylum are the same 
people who would now take the 
opportunity provided by §26.2.  
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4.4. LACK OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION OPENS INFORMATION VACUUM 
1. It	was	generally	not	defined	what	“success”	means	for	the	Western	Balkan	Regulation	and	how	this	
should be measured (i.e. by application or asylum numbers alone, by type of migrants, or by type of jobs). 
2. Correspondingly, it was unclear what exactly would constitute “misuse” or “fraudulent abuse” of such 
a	rule	or	how	to	measure	it.	This	creates	misgivings	among	many	policy	officials	when	it	comes	to	
evaluating	the	usefulness	of	the	regulation	or	its	continuation	beyond	2020.	Further,	because	no	official	
statistics were collected on the number and type of abuses of the Western Balkan Regulation, we cannot 
know	more	precisely	how	significant	this	issue	is.
3. As part of the application process, there was no data collected on whether the asylum applicants in 
Germany who returned to the Western Balkans in or after 2015 were the same ones who later applied 
(successfully or unsuccessfully) for a work visa through the Western Balkan Regulation. This would have 
been crucial to examine whether or not “legal pathways” can in fact re-route other types of migration, or 
whether	they	address	different	people	altogether.	
4. The	government	agencies	currently	do	not	collect	data	on	the	profile	and	motives	of	those	applying	for	
a visa and admitted to Germany under the Western Balkan Regulation, nor is there any information on 
what happens to admitted migrants after they arrive in Germany (e.g. do they switch jobs, how many are 
laid	off,	do	they\how	many	return).	
5. On the business side, no data is collected on the background of the employer and how they relate to the 
employee. 
An	official	evaluation	of	the	Western	Balkan	Regulation	conducted	by	the	Institute	for	Employment	Research	
(iab) of the Western Balkan Regulation is currently underway 50	and	may	be	able	to	fill	at	least	some	of	these	
gaps. 
There was surprisingly little communication about the new legal pathway. Our research on the commu-
nication revealed that while the regulation was heavily debated and discussed inside Germany, there 
was almost no communication about it in the target countries. While information campaigns and com-
munication channels were used to dissuade people from going to Germany under the asylum system, 
there were no official government or other campaigns to promote the new legal channels within the 
countries themselves and portray the regulation as a disincentive to come irregularly. In fact, during our 
interviews, some government officials from countries of origin did not know that the Western Balkan 
Regulation even existed. It was thus neither communicated broadly to the government partners, nor to 
the wider public. This is not entirely surprising, as presumably policymakers did not want to advertise 
new opportunities to come and encourage additional migration. 
It is possible that the prime target audience for the German Western Balkan Regulation were asylum 
seekers already in Germany, to provide them incentives to return. However, it is not clear what exactly 
motivated returns or how many people were made aware of the new labor-market opening. There are 
also no figures on whether the people who had previously applied for asylum were now those applying 
for work visas. As of March 2018, the official government return consultations with asylum applicants 
do not involve communicating about the Western Balkan Regulation to asylum applicants already in 
Germany,51 though in our interviews we did encounter civil society organizations who mention the 
regulation as part of their consultation with asylum seekers from the region.
50  The evaluation analyzes the impact of the Western Balkan Regulation and will consist of two parts. The quantitative analysis 
will look into the integration of migrants from the Western Balkan. The qualitative part will look into employment case 
studies and will use interviews to assess motives, conditions and processes of employment situations resulting from the 
Western Balkan Regulation. Federal Institute for Employment Research (IAB) (Website). (2018, July 20). Evaluation of the 
Western Balkans Regulation. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2NxwYFg
51 	Deutscher	Bundestag.	(2018).
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As the numbers of visa 
applications and the lines 
in front of the German 
consulate in Pristina attest, 
the information about a “new 
channel” or a “Germany rule,” 
as one interviewee called it, 
spread nonetheless, as did the 
information that it now was 
much easier to get a legal work 
permit in Germany without any minimum qualification requirements. Because it was coming from mixed 
sources, including sometimes from dubious recruiters, this information was not always reliable. The 
question here becomes who benefits from a messy communication channel, and what should be done 
differently if a similar policy is pursued again.
Like many policies, and certainly those taken in moments of heightened tension, the Western Balkan 
Regulation has had some unintended consequences and leaves a number of questions open.
NO CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE ON WHETHER REGULATION MEETS REAL LABOR MARKET NEEDS 
Regarding the German labor market, the Western Balkan Regulation raised two contentious issues in 
particular: whether it in fact met real labor marked demand, and whether in fact there is real demand 
in the un-/low-skilled sector. As outlined in the beginning of the paper, some politicians claimed that 
the Western Balkan Regulation would generally be positive for the economy and in tune with German 
labor market needs, while the employers association maintained that it would not.52 Two years into the 
regulation, there is no conclusive evidence to support one claim above the other, but limited evidence 
for both claims exists. 
Generally speaking, the Western Balkan Regulation’s prerequisite of requiring a valid job offer for which 
no other eligible person could be found (priority check) was designed to minimize risks for the labor 
market. This connection was in effect significantly weakened by the long visa processing times, as well as 
the large discrepancy between applications and actual numbers of visas issued. Presumably, there were 
labor needs that were left unmet for months as the approval process dragged on. In addition there were 
insufficient control mechanisms, as outlined above.
From a strict labor-market view, there seems to be a skill-mismatch. While fifty-one percent53 of all pre-
approval requests through the Western Balkan Regulation were for jobs in the unskilled or low-skilled 
sector, Germany is in much bigger need of workers for the skilled sector: Of a total of 792,637 vacant 
jobs in May 2018, only 18% (144,799) are in the “helper (Helfer)” category, meaning they do not require a 
formal education. About 65%, or 517,854 are vacant jobs for skilled workers.54 If you add the category of 
experts and specialists, then 82% of open jobs in Germany require skilled employees, giving credibility 
to the claim that the people arriving via the Western Balkan Regulation are not those that a labor 
recruitment strategy would target. Additionally, almost half of the currently unemployed in Germany 
(47% of 2.3 million) also lack formal qualification and in theory could be suitable for these types of helper 
52 	Berliner	Morgenpost.	(3.10.2016). Arbeits-Visa: Noch kommen wenige Menschen vom Westbalkan. Retrieved from  
https://bit.ly/2NBqmGB.
53 	Deutscher	Bundestag.	(2018).	
54 	Federal	Employment	Agency.	(2018). Arbeitsmarktdaten nach Zielberufen: Arbeitslose, Arbeitsuchende und gemeldete 
Arbeitsstellen, Mai 2018. Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2N32bRd
4.5. KNOWN UNKNOWNS AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
The question here becomes who 
benefits from messy communica-
tion, and what should be done  
differently if a similar policy is  
pursued again.
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jobs. Another group competing for open positions are newly recognized refugees. Currently about 25% 
of refugees are employed in Germany.55 One labor market expert suggested in our interview that it 
might make more sense to encourage employers to hire (recognized) refugees already in Germany, with 
the state helping to upskill them so that they can fit employers need, rather than hiring people from the 
Western Balkans.
On the other hand, employers do need unskilled labor. While the 18% of open jobs for the unskilled 
is much lower than the 82% for skilled, that is still over 140,000 open jobs – and demand for unskilled 
labor seems to be growing.56 Furthermore, the primary tool for identifying segments of the labor 
market where there is a serious shortage of skilled workers is the so-called “white-list,” (Positivliste) but 
this does not look at potential shortages in the low-skilled sector.57 Employers in the construction and 
hospitality sectors have stated that they have used the regulation to fill crucial labor shortages.58 
It is important to remember that the Western Balkan Regulation was not devised solely, or even 
primarily, as a labor-recruitment strategy. Nonetheless, as it is tied to employment it is entwined with 
labor market considerations, 
and the question of whether 
there is an actual need in the 
low-skilled or unskilled sector 
would have consequences for 
further debates; for instance, 
whether such legal pathways for 
third country nationals to the 
low-skilled sector for seasonal 
work, such as in agriculture or 
hospitality, might be advisable. The forthcoming evaluation of the IAB may shed more light on short and 
medium-term effects of §26.2 on the labor market. 
DIASPORA TIES SIGNIFICANTLY SHAPE MIGRATION MOVEMENTS, ALSO UNDER THE REGULATION
As is widely known, transnational diaspora networks can play an important part in migratory movements, 
a	fact	that	seems	also	to	have	been	a	significant	shaping	factor	as	part	of	the	Western	Balkan	Regulation.59 
Not surprisingly, interviewees frequently mentioned the prominence of diaspora networks in shaping 
movements from the Western Balkans to Germany, ranging from information exchange—say on low 
chances of obtaining asylum—to work opportunities through the Western Balkan Regulation or in 
facilitating the move to Germany. As mentioned, family ties continue to play an important part in the 
economic and social fabric of the region of the Western Balkans and hence it is not surprising that 
business owners in Germany, such as diaspora members of earlier movements to Germany, may employ 
members of their wider family network. This fact was most frequently brought up for the construction 
sector,	but	no	statistics	exist	about	the	profile	or	citizenship	of	employers	to	verify	this	claim.	While	exact	
numbers regarding the size of the diaspora from the Western Balkans are hard to come by, the 2005 
foreigner’s registry listed 493,915 people from former Yugoslav republics as living in Germany.60 In 2017, 
55 	Rheinische	Post.	(5.31.2018).	Jeder vierte Flüchtling hat einen Job. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2Ni9hR8
56 	According	to	the	government-affiliated	Institute	for	Employment	Research	(IAB),	Germany	is	actually	currently	showing	
a trend of increased job numbers in two segments: among specialists and experts, as well as in the low skilled “helpers” 
segment (and to a lesser extent in the skilled-jobs segment). Institute for Employment Research. (2017). Westbalkanregelung: 
Arbeit statt Asyl? P. 16. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2KHyc3L
57 	The	whitelist	is	updated	about	twice	a	year,	the	last	one	from	March	2018	can	be	accessed	here:	https://bit.ly/2Msq2cD
58  Die Welt. (7.29.2018). Wird das migrationspolitische Experiment noch ausgeweitet? Retrieved from https://bit.ly/2NVWUu6
59 	Shehu,	Ujbien	and	Gejsu	Plaku.	(2015).	(Kosovo-)Albanische Migration und Diaspora, Migrationsprofil und Stellenwert der 
Diaspora für die Reformprozesse in Albanien und Kosovo unter Berücksichtigung der albanischen Migration in Griechenland und 
Italien und der kosovo-albanischen Migration in Deutschland und der Schweiz. P.74. Retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2J7BJCE
60 	ibid,	p.	222
It is important to remember that 
the Western Balkan Regulation 
was not devised solely, or even 
primarily, as a labor-recruitment 
strategy. 
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the number of all citizens from all six countries from the Western Balkans residing in Germany taken 
together amounts to almost 785,000.61 This number does not include those who have taken on German 
nationality or who did not declare their departure from Germany. Currently, some estimate that the 
Kosovar diaspora in Germany is at about 300,00062, while the foreigner’s registry for 2017 places that 
number at 208,505 (compared to 136,937 in 2010). The Kosovar diaspora is hence the second largest 
Western Balkan diaspora in Germany after the Serbian, with 225,535 Serbian nationals residing in 
Germany as of December 2017 (compared to 197,984 in 2010). It is plausible that the diaspora also 
contributes	to	the	different	outcomes	of	the	Western	Balkan	Regulation	in	individual	countries.	For	
instance, the large Kosovar diaspora in Germany might credibly be a contributing factor for high share 
of Kosovars applying. 
THE WESTERN BALKAN REGULATION HAS RAISED EXPECTATIONS AND BRAIN DRAIN 
CONCERNS 
Among our interviewees in Serbia and Kosovo, the Western Balkan Regulation was received very 
differently	and	with	varying	degrees	of	detailed	knowledge	about	the	regulation.	While	some	claimed	
that it was widely known among the people, others had never heard of it, among them also government 
officials	and	migration	researchers.	Some	voiced	concerns	that	the	regulation	had	certainly	raised	
expectations in the country for continued labor migration to Germany beyond 2020. Known as “the 
Germany rule,” certain people in Kosovo hoped that Switzerland and Austria, also home to a large Kosovar 
diaspora, would soon follow suit with a similar rule. At this point in time it is unclear whether the Western 
Balkan Regulation will be extended beyond 2020, but our interviewees were in agreement in claiming that 
in the case of Kosovo, at least, 
people would try to come 
irregularly again if the rule 
ceased to exist, irrespective of 
stricter border controls.
While many hope it will 
continue, others are 
concerned about the 
consequences. Interviewees 
mentioned the emigration 
of skilled workers as a major 
challenge for the region, 
which	they	say	was	intensified	
by the Western Balkan 
Regulation. Co-existence of 
high unemployment rates 
with simultaneous lack of skilled workers is a prominent feature in the countries of the Western Balkans. 
As about 46% of pre-approvals were granted for skilled workers, constituting a sizeable share of the 
emigrant work force through the regulation.63 Sectors with skill shortages in the region, according to our 
interviews, included wood processing or technical maintenance jobs for machineries in Kosovo, and a lack 
of bus and truck drivers in Serbia. More research on such shortages and their relationship to the Western 
Balkan	Regulation	are	needed	in	order	to	offer	more	definitive	conclusions,	but	the	impact	on	sending	
countries is another important consideration. 
61 	Statistisches	Bundesamt	(Destatis).	(2018).	Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, Ausländische Bevölkerung,
 Ergebnisse des Ausländerzentralregisters. P.22-29, own calculation, retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2KqyMSC, 
62 	Shehu	(2015),	p.220
63 	Deutscher	Bundestag.	(2018).
The regulation certainly raised 
expectations in the country for 
continued labor migration to 
Germany beyond 2020. Known as 
“the Germany rule,” certain people 
in Kosovo hoped that Switzerland 
and Austria, also home to a large 
Kosovar diaspora, would soon 
follow suit with a similar rule. 
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RISE OF FRAUDULENT SERVICES AND RECRUITMENT AGENCIES
One does not have to walk far from the German Embassy in Pristina to see travel and recruitment agen-
cies lined up, one after another. Interviewees reported that the number of such agencies mushroomed 
after the Western Balkan Regulation came into effect. While not all are fraudulent, some apparently 
promised to provide work visas even though they are in no position to authorize and approve them. 
Others claimed to get faster visa appointments at the German embassy, even though the normal book-
ing system is free of charge and no special arrangements exist for expedited services. However, it was 
also reported that for some applicants the visa process could seem too complicated and they hence 
willingly use the overpriced services of agencies. While there are no valid numbers of how many people 
have fallen prey to fraudulent recruitment services which link up with employers in Germany aiming to 
exploit their future workers, several policymakers from Kosovo raised concerns about the well-being of 
their citizens abroad.
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The Western Balkan Regulation came about during the politically tumultuous times of 2015, at the height 
of the record number of people arriving in Europe and Germany. Embedded in a package of restrictive 
measures that were aimed to reduce the number of asylum seekers from the Western Balkans, the 
regulation that opening up the German labor market to people from the region passed parliament 
as more of a political bargain between conservative and left-leaning parties than as a clearly devised 
policy. It nevertheless rested loosely on two assumptions that some politicians voiced at the time: 
that creating legal pathways would, somehow, contribute to reducing the number of people entering 
through the asylum system, and that it would also benefit the German economy and be in line with labor 
needs. The final verdict on both 
fronts is still out. Nonetheless, 
it ended up being a valuable 
policy experiment in migration 
management, particularly by 
including even those without 
formal qualifications seeking 
jobs in the low-skilled sector.
While the number of policy 
measures at the time, 
including faster processing, 
faster deportations, stricter 
coordination and enforcement 
at the borders of the Balkan 
states after the Vienna summit almost certainly played their part in bringing down the number of 
people entering Germany after October 2015, there are indications that the potential of work permits, 
combined with stricter enforcement, did indeed contribute to “taking pressure out of the asylum system” 
as one interviewee in Pristina put it. Because the policy was not intended as an experiment, the initial 
set up of the Western Balkan Regulation did not include any systematic collection of information or data 
points that would have been useful to evaluate it from a migration management standpoint, and to give 
an indication as to whether such rule in fact can significantly “re-route” or deter irregular migration. In 
light of discussion about applying similar polices to other countries or regions in the future, the results 
of the regulation do, however, point to important policy lessons regarding implementation, potential 
efficacy, as well as some considerations about unintended consequences.
Two crucial contextual factors specific to the Western Balkan Regulation are important to keep in mind, 
especially when drawing conclusions about replicability or transferability to other regions. First, the 
migration regulation experiment is taking place during times in which the German economy is doing 
very well, and unemployment (August 2018) is very low at 5.1%. In less prosperous times with higher 
unemployment levels, different considerations may need to be made. Second, as the states of the 
Western Balkan are at different stages on a path to EU membership, opening up legal channels in a way 
pre-dates future mobility agreement and informs integration efforts towards the region. These factors 
are rather specific for the context of the Western Balkan Regulation, but there are more general lessons 
that can be drawn from the first years of the policy if it is applied as a model moving forward. 
The initial set up of the Western 
Balkan Regulation did not include 
any systematic collection of 
information or data points that 
would have been useful to evaluate 
it from a migration management 
standpoint.
5. CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
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1. BE CLEAR ON THE GOALS AND POLICY LOGIC OF ANY NEW RULE FOR LEGAL PATHWAYS TO 
THE LABOR MARKET AND DEFINE DATA POINTS FOR EVALUATION ACCORDINGLY
While policy makers and experts often call for “legal pathways” as an important component for reducing 
irregular migration, it is often unclear exactly how legal channels to the labor market would ideally 
influence migration movements. This was also the case with the Western Balkan Regulation. In the 
future, any new regulation should define and agree on the underlying logic implied: Is it a foreign policy 
logic needed to ease return and deportation policies with countries of origin? Is it to “re-route” irregular 
migration from a country or region to regular channels? Is it based on real demands of the labor market? 
A demographic argument? Some of these logics may be compatible, but they certainly do not all lead to 
identical policies. Only if policymakers are clear on the logic of their legislation, and correspondingly, on 
how many and what type of workers or migrants they want or expect, or which type of people the rule 
addresses (former asylum applicants? Potential future migrants?), can we determine the usefulness of 
such policy tools. 
Importantly, based on these goals and logic, clear data points should be put in place, including regarding 
the collection of information that will help to monitor and evaluate the success of any new rule.
2. THERE IS NO “ONE SIZE FITS ALL” APPROACH WHEN IT COMES TO TRANSFERRING THE MODEL 
TO OTHER COUNTRIES OR REGIONS
As the initial facts and figures indicate, and as was underscored by our interviews, the exact way the 
Western Balkan Regulation affected applications for visa, actual migration movements, as well as 
irregular migration, both in profile of migrants or in scale, varied significantly from one country to 
another – and this within one somewhat homogenous region. One important shaping factor seems to 
be the sizeable diaspora of people from the Western Balkans already in Germany, which could explain 
the high interest in job offers and work permits for certain countries. In addition, diaspora networks 
also function as important bridge builders and integrating forces, making it an important aspect related 
to questions of integration, in particular as the regulation did not require pre-departure training 
or language instruction. Thus, any consideration of using the Western Balkan Regulation for other 
countries, say in Africa, would need to take into account national and regional specifics. Finally, there is 
the further variable of other destinations. Hope voiced by people in Kosovo that Austria and Switzerland 
would also soon create a “Germany rule” indicate that future similar pathways should consider other 
possible destination countries.
3. IMPROVE COORDINATION BETWEEN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES AND PROCESSES VIA NEW 
ROLES AND EXPANDED MANDATES
The Western Balkan Regulation was implemented in very short time under crisis mode, putting many 
involved institutions and processes to an ultimate stress test. Any new rule should carefully think 
through adequate processes and mandates. Notably, embassies were not fully staffed to deal with 
increased visa applications resulting from the Western Balkan Regulation, nor was a uniform or standard 
briefing	supplied.	Other	than	increasing	the	staff	at	embassies,	potential	solutions	could	also	be	to	create	
and	install	permanent	liaison	officers	at	embassies	to	coordinate	on	all	matters	regarding	legal	migration	
with	the	institutions	back	home	in	Germany,	for	example	with	the	federal	employment	office	or	the	
Foreigner’s	Office.	In	addition,	a	rotational	scheme	could	be	envisaged	that	could	post	employees	of	the	
Foreigner’s	Registration	Office,	the	Federal	Employment	Agency	or	the	Federal	Office	for	Migration	and	
Refugees at German embassies abroad, so that actors understand each other’s processes and reasoning 
better and to avoid miscommunication or misinterpretation of actions, say on the issuance of visas. 
It would be further important to establish a regular unit or system that registers, controls and screens 
employers wanting to hire migrant labor (particularly large scale) under any such special regulation 
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and that multiple institutions, including visa embassy staff, have access to such a registry. Not only 
could this ensure the safety of workers and prevent abuse and misuse of the regulation, but it would 
also keep public trust in the system, which is of vital importance for any migration policy. The mandate 
and capacity of the German customs (Zoll) could be expanded in this regard and should be involved 
systematically from the outset in any special rule or pathway, ideally in a way that would allow the 
agency to share findings and accessible data sets, e.g. potential employer blacklists, with the other 
relevant administrative offices. Proper monitoring and data collection is crucial to prevent and address 
misuse and suspicions of misuse, as well as simply to gauge efficacy and make necessary adaptations.
4. CONSIDER LABOR MARKET AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS
There is not clear evidence whether the Western Balkan Regulation meets crucial needs of the German 
labor market, even if some policymakers have made statements to this effect. In light of high public 
interest in such matters, expectations should be managed more carefully. There is no evidence that legal 
pathways that include the low or unskilled sector of the German labor market should be abandoned, but 
it does need careful consideration moving forward, especially regarding potential medium and long-term 
consequences of such migration. Specifically, more studies and data are urgently needed that address 
needs in the low or unskilled sectors of the German labor market, for instance as part of seasonal 
agricultural work or construction and hospitality. Further research is needed to assess if and how labor 
market outcomes and hiring of refugees already in Germany may be affected by hiring through the 
Western Balkan Regulation. Finally, we must also look into potential negative effects on the local work 
force, as well as a potential down-skilling of migrant labor, i.e. that people end up in jobs that they are 
in fact overqualified for. Any new rule should further consider the integration perspectives of workers, 
especially in local communities. It could prove detrimental at some point, for instance, for individual 
workers that the regulation did not require any pre-departure training or language requirements. 
Finally, a migration policy should ideally consider also labor and development effects in the sending 
countries. While in Germany there may be questions about receiving an over-proportion of unskilled 
workers, emigration of skilled workers from the Western Balkan region can lead to painful gaps in 
the local labor market with negative consequences for the political and economic development of the 
region. 
5. CONSIDER ROLE FOR APPROPRIATE INTERMEDIARIES, PREVENT FRAUDULENT RECRUITMENT 
PROCESSES
After the Western Balkan Regulation came into force, recruitment agencies mushroomed in short time, 
some of them using questionable procedures and tactics for recruitment as reported by interviewees. 
The German government should work with national governments in the region to certify or regulate 
recruiters and agencies to prevent fraud and abuse, or perhaps verify trusted recruitment agencies 
themselves. It could, for example, follow the guidelines of the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) International Recruitment Integrity System (IRIS), which aims to identify and support ethical labor 
recruiters, promote a shift of recruitment costs from the worker to the employer, and call for increasing 
the transparency in recruitment processes and labor supply chains. In general, any new regulation 
should carefully weigh the role of potential intermediaries, and how these can help or hinder the 
intended application of any migration regulation.
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6. PURSUE A PROACTIVE COMMUNICATION STRATEGY, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND ABROAD AS 
VITAL PART IN ANY NEW RULE
It is notoriously difficult to measure whether and how providing information can influence acceptance 
of policies domestically, or how it may impact intentions to migrate or return to countries of origin. 
While it was notable that there was virtually no official communication on the Western Balkan Regulation 
itself outside of Germany, first experiences with the German Information Point for Migration, Vocational 
Training and Career (DIMAK) in Kosovo show that there is an appetite for consultation and information 
on migration channels, and that they are increasingly used by returnees but also by those wanting to 
emigrate at some point. At the same time, policymakers need to carefully consider communication 
strategies for the domestic audience, to ensure that they address concerns and highlight benefits of any 
new rule, and also address alleged misuse or doubts about the match with German labor market needs. 
Moreover, a lack of communication leaves an information gap easily filled by others who may have 
questionable motives. If policy makers do not control the message at home and abroad, information can 
easily be bent, misinterpreted or willfully misrepresented.
At the point of finalizing this paper in September 2018, it is unclear whether the Western Balkan 
Regulation will be extended, adjusted, or stopped after 2020, and what the consequence of any of these 
moves will be. What is clear is that the question of whether and how legal pathways to the labor market 
are a necessary ingredient in decreasing irregular migration will continue to be a crucial policy question 
for Germany for the years to come. This will include the question of whether any such schemes should 
include employment in the low-skilled sector. At this moment, when Germany is reordering both its 
asylum and immigration laws and systems, the lessons from the Western Balkan Regulation can offer 
valuable insights. In particular as Germany and Europe are shifting their focus toward partnerships with 
African countries on the management of migration, the lessons from the initial stages of the Western 
Balkan Regulation can inform negotiations or pilot programs. It is imperative that any such approach 
is grounded in medium-to long-term policy horizons and cannot be a hasty reaction to pressure from 
domestic political debates. As well-managed and coherent migration policies are difficult enough to 
achieve in the best of circumstances, let us be sure to make use of all available resources and lessons. 
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BERTELSMANN STIFTUNG
Founded in 1977, the Bertelsmann Stiftung is committed to ensuring that everyone in society is given a 
fair chance to participate. Its aims include improving education, shaping democracy, advancing societies, 
promoting health, vitalizing culture and strengthening economies. Structured as a private operating 
foundation, the Bertelsmann Stiftung is politically non-partisan and works independently of Bertelsmann 
SE	&	Co.	KGaA.	The	Stiftung	follows	the	conviction	that	migration	and	development	issues	cannot	be	
considered independently of each other. International cooperation on migration is necessary if we are to 
adequately address the interests of migrants, destination countries and countries of origin in achieving 
viable solutions for all stakeholders. The Bertelsmann Stiftung advocates this triple-win approach both 
within and beyond Germany. 
For more information: www.faire-migration.de
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, 
national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan.
GMF contributes research and analysis and convenes leaders on transatlantic issues relevant to 
policymakers. GMF offers rising leaders opportunities to develop their skills and networks through 
transatlantic exchange, and supports civil society in the Balkans and Black Sea regions by fostering 
democratic initiatives, rule of law, and regional cooperation.
Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, nonprofit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent 
memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. 
In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, 
Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and 
Stockholm.
For more information: www.gmfus.org
ROBERT BOSCH STIFTUNG
The Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH is one of Europe’s largest foundations associated with a private 
company. In its charitable work, it addresses social issues at an early stage and develops exemplary 
solutions. For this purpose, it plans and implements its own projects. Additionally, it supports third-party 
initiatives that have similar goals.
The Robert Bosch Stiftung is active in the areas of health, science, society, education, and international 
relations. 
Moreover, in the coming years, the Foundation will increasingly direct its activities on three focus areas: 
› Migration, Integration, and Inclusion 
› Social Cohesion in Germany and Europe 
› Sustainable Living Spaces 
Since it was established in 1964, the Robert Bosch Stiftung has invested around 1.6 billion euros in 
charitable work.
For more information: www.bosch-stiftung.de/migration 
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ABOUT THE MIGRATION STRATEGY GROUP ON INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The Migration Strategy Group on International Cooperation and Development (MSG) is an initiative  
by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Bertelsmann Foundation, and the Robert Bosch 
Foundation. The MSG brings about 25-30 representatives from different German ministries and other 
relevant actors together at regular intervals, in order to discuss current migration-related foreign and 
development policy issues. From 2018-2019, the MSG will focus on the phenomena of ‘mixed migration’ 
flows and whether it is possible or sensible to attempt to disentangle them — particularly focused on 
cooperation with countries of Sub-Sahara Africa. 
While this paper is part of the MSG project, it is not the direct result of any of the MSG discussions and it 
reflects the opinions of the authors only.

